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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 930160-CA 
v. : 
SONJA LE SWANSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction by guilty plea of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 1993), in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Washington County, the Honorable James L. Shumate presid-
ing. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Attorney/Firm Relationship. Did the district court 
err in determining that the prosecutorial and governmental 
functions perfoirmed by members of the firm of Gallian, Westfall & 
Wilcox did not embroil defendant's appointed counsel in a con-
flict of interest under State v. Brown? 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it will review a 
trial court's "determination of whether a given set of facts 
comes within the reach of a given rule of law" for correctness, 
according the trial court "a measure of discretion" or "some 
discretion"; however, "precisely how much discretion we cannot 
say." State v. Pena. No. 930101, slip op. at 5, 10, 11 n.6 (Utah 
Feb. 15, 1994). 
2. Ineffective Assistance, Was defendant's appointed 
counsel otherwise ineffective under the sixth amendment? 
[Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
present a mixed question of fact and law. 
Therefore, in a situation where a trial court 
has previously heard a motion based on inef-
fective assistance of counsel, reviewing 
courts are free to make an independent deter-
mination of a trial court's conclusions. The 
factual findings of the trial court, however, 
shall not be set aside on appeal unless clea-
rly erroneous. 
State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (citing Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)). 
3. Attorney's Pees. Should this Court award attor-
ney's fees to defendant for private, non-appointed counsel under 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 (Supp. 1993)? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any 
ruling of the district court. 
4. General Order. Does this Court have jurisdiction 
to promulgate a general order governing attorney conflicts of 
interest? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any 
ruling of the district court. 
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5, Dismissal of Charges. If this Court finds that 
defendant's representation did not comport with applicable law, 
should all charges against defendant be dismissed with prejudice? 
This issue does not require this Court to review any 
ruling of the district court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2. Assignment of counsel on 
request of defendant or order of court. 
(1) Counsel shall be assigned to represent each 
indigent person who is under arrest for or charged with 
a crime in which there is a substantial probability 
that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either 
jail or prison if: 
(a) the defendant requests it; or 
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise so 
orders and the defendant does not affirmatively waive 
or reject on the record the opportunity to be repre-
sented. 
(2) (a) If the county, city, or town responsible 
to provide for the legal defense of an indigent defen-
dant has arranged by contract to provide those services 
and the court has received notice or a copy of such 
contract, the court shall appoint the contracting 
attorney as legal counsel to represent that defendant. 
(b) The court shall select and appoint the attor-
ney or attorneys if: 
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is 
with multiple attorneys; or 
(ii) the contract is with an additional attor-
ney or attorneys in the event of a conflict of inter-
est. 
(c) If the court considers the appointment of a 
noncontracting attorney to provide legal services to an 
indigent defendant despite the existence of an indigent 
legal services contract and the court has a copy or 
notice of such contract, before the court may make the 
appointment, it shall: 
(i) set the matter for a hearing; 
(ii) give proper notice to the attorney of the 
responsible county, city, or town of the hearing; and 
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling 
reason to appoint a noncontracting attorney. 
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(d) The indigent defendant's mere preference for 
other counsel shall not be considered a compelling 
reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting 
attorney. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3. Duties of assigned counsel -
Compensation• 
(1) When representing an indigent person the 
assigned counsel shall: 
(a) Counsel and defend him at every stage of the 
proceeding following assignment; and 
(b) Prosecute any first appeal of right or other 
remedies before or after conviction that he considers 
to be in the interest of justice except for other and 
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ 
proceedings. 
(2) An assigned counsel shall not have the duty or 
power under this section to represent an indigent 
defendant in any discretionary appeal or action for a 
discretionary writ, other than in a meaningful first 
appeal of right to assure the indigent defendant an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in 
the context of the appellate process of this state. 
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent defendant 
shall be entitled to compensation upon the approval of 
the district court where the original trial was held, 
upon a showing that the defendant has been denied a 
constitutional right or that there was newly discovered 
evidence that would show the defendant's innocence and 
that the legal services rendered by counsel were other 
than that required under this act or under a separate 
fee arrangement and were necessary for the indigent 
defendant and not for the purpose of delaying the 
judgment of the original" trier of fact. 
Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.10(a). 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of 
them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of 
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so 
by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information as follows: 
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Count I Possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (Cum, Supp. 
1993) 
Count II Possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990) 
(R. 2). On January 14, 1993, at a "felony arraignment," the 
district court questioned defendant as to her assets and appoint-
ed public defender J. MacArthur Wright as her counsel (R. 3, 
105). Defendant pled guilty to count I, and the court dismissed 
count II (R. 15-16) . 
Defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years and a fine of 
$10,000 (R. 52). Execution of the sentence was stayed and 
defendant was placed on 36-month probation and ordered to serve 
60 days in the Washington County Jail, 30 days of which were 
stayed upon condition that defendant obtain substance abuse 
counseling (R. 53). Defendant appeals from this judgment (R. 69-
71) . 
On March 4, 1993, R'. Clayton Huntsman entered his 
appearance as defendant's counsel and filed a notice of appeal 
and a petition for a certificate of probable cause (R. 21-29). 
On March 10, 1993, defendant moved for an order finding 
her indigent and requiring the county to pay for her transcript 
and other costs (R. 48-50). On March 12, 1993, defendant filed a 
motion for costs and attorney's fees, alleging bad faith on the 
part of the Washington County Attorney's Office (R. 56-59). The 
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same day, after a hearing, the district court found defendant to 
be indigent and ordered Washington County to pay for a transcript 
of all proceedings on her case, "as well as costs of the first 
right of appeal, including appeal of the Certificate of Probable 
Cause if necessary" (R. 63-64, 66). However, the court denied 
defendant's request for attorney's fees on the ground that the 
court found no bad faith on the part of the State (R. 66, 86-87). 
Near the end of the hearing on the certificate of 
probable cause, the prosecution made two offers on the record. 
Notwithstanding its belief that defendant was "treated fairly and 
provided with very competent and effective counsel," the State 
stipulated that defendant could withdraw her guilty plea "and the 
Court could reset the case for a jury trial and let justice 
prevail." In the alternative, the State stipulated "that a 
Certificate of Probable Cause should issue in this case" (R. 
293). Defendant responded to neither of these offers. 
On March 17, 1993, after a hearing, the district court 
granted the certificate of probable cause (R. 67-68). The court 
drafted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 91-
98, addendum E). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After she was sentenced, defendant asked Clayton 
Huntsman, her present counsel, to assist her (R. 33). He filed a 
notice of appeal and represented her at the hearing on her 
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petition for a certificate of probable cause. The following 
facts were adduced at the hearing on the petition. 
Mr. Wright is one of two Washington County public 
defenders. He handles half of all non-capital criminal cases and 
all the capital cases (R. 224-25, 262). 
After Mr. Wright had been appointed, defendant contact-
ed him by calling the number listed in the telephone directory 
for the firm of Gallian & Westfall (R. 158). She was familiar 
with the firm because she had hired John Hummel of the firm to 
represent her in a custody dispute involving her daughter (R. 
239) . 
Mr. Wright appears in a photograph of the members of 
Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox published in a display ad in a local 
telephone directory (Exhibit D-l, page 19; R. 185; addendum A). 
Defendant had seen this photograph of the law firm or another 
like it before she entered her guilty plea (R. 245-460). 
In that directory, Mr. Wright is listed as a member of 
the firm without additional designation, although he had intended 
for his name to be listed as "of counsel" and the printers were 
told to list it that way (Exhibit D-l, page 18; R. 185, 270; 
addendum B) . In a telephone directory issued by another publish-
er, Mr. Wright is listed as "of counsel" (Ex. D-3, R. 187, 
addendum C) . Mr. Wright's name appears on the firm letterhead, 
designated as "of counsel" (Ex. P-2, R. 183, addendum D). The 
firm pays for the letterhead (R. 274). 
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When asked to define the term "of counsel," Mr. Wright 
testified, "I don't define it. I can tell you what our relation-
ship is, if that's what you want" (R. 180). Defendant testified 
that she did not know what "of counsel" meant (R. 250) . Russell 
Gallian testified that he did not think there was a legal defini-
tion of the term, that it "describes a relationship that is not 
an employee and not a partner," that its meaning "varies quite a 
bit depending upon the specific relationship," and that he had 
always thought of it as like an office sharing arrangement, at 
least economically (R. 258-59, 267). Mr. Wright does not associ-
ate with the firm on any case (R. 260). 
The firm name, "Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox," appears on 
the law firm's office door (R. 158-59). Mr. Wright's name does 
not (R. 186) . If a client came to the office looking for Mr. 
Wright, he or she would have to go through the firm's offices in 
order to find Mr. Wright (R. 187). As of December 1992, Mr. 
Wright's office was moved down the hall "to try and create a 
little more separation" (R. 269). 
Mr. Wright pays a specific flat amount of rent plus "a 
percentage of his civil cases" to the firm each month (R. 180, 
254) . He also shares secretary, receptionist, word processing, 
and telephone services (R. 180-81). Mr. Wright's secretary uses 
her word processor for all the attorneys she works for, including 
other members of the firm (R. 182). Mr. Wright testified that 
his secretary does not discuss his cases with anybody else, nor 
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anyone else's cases with him (R. 189). Nor does he have any 
knowledge about the cases the firm prosecutes in the town of 
Ivins (R. 190). 
Mr. Wright testified that he would not go on the 
opposite side of a case that the Gallian firm was handling, in 
part because "I wouldn't want to appear that there was any 
problem" (R. 190). He further testified, "If Miss Swanson 
obviously had been sued by Gallian & Westfall or was a client of 
Gallian & Westfall, I'd say that I certainly would not have been 
able to have represented her. But she was not" (R. 199). 
Mr. Gallian is the senior partner in the law firm of 
Gallian & Westfall, also known as Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox (R. 
180, 253) . Mr. Gallian and his firm are the town attorneys for 
the town of Ivins (R. 143-44, 254) .* John Hummel of that firm 
appeared as a prosecutor in the justice court in Ivins (R. 
145) .2 
As town attorney, Mr. Gallian's job description in-
cludes advising the town with regard to police policies or 
practices and giving legal opinions to police officers (R. 275-
76). The town of Ivins contracts with two Washington County 
1
 The firm discontinued its prosecutorial function the evening 
prior to the hearing (R. 311). At that time, Mr. Wright's 
representation of defendant had been completed. 
2
 John Hummel also serves as the public defender for the City 
of Kanab (R. 311). 
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sheriffs to serve as town police officers (R. 277). However, Mr, 
Gallian is not involved in any prosecutorial decisions (R. 278). 
Mr. Gallian also serves as a Washington County commis-
sioner (R. 253). He supervises the county attorney's office, the 
jail, the sheriff's department, and other law enforcement, and is 
involved in issues such as salaries, hiring, firing, retention, 
and promotions. However, he is not involved in day-to-day law 
enforcement activities (R. 264). Mr. Gallian has never voted on 
Mr. Wright's contract with the county, and testified that if it 
comes to a vote, he'll abstain (R. 256). 
Since becoming public defender, Mr. Wright has not 
prosecuted a case in Washington County or in the town of Ivins 
(R. 201, 255). 
Steve Trost, Utah Bar counsel, testified as an expert 
on matters of attorney ethics (R. 296). He testified that 
although "of counsel" is an amorphous term, it indicates an 
association closer to a partnership than to an office-sharing 
arrangement (R. 3 01-02) . 
Mr. Trost also gave his expert opinion that it was 
unethical for Mr. Wright to act as public defender in light of 
his arrangement with Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox (R. 304). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. In the trial court, the State stipulated to the 
withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea. In the same spirit, the 
State on appeal concedes reversible error in this case. Defen-
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dant's appointed defense counsel had a close of counsel relation-
ship with the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox. Members of 
that firm acted as prosecutors and police advisors in the town of 
Ivins and served on the Washington County Commission. Although 
State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), does not address the 
question of imputation of conflicts, on the facts of this case, 
the appointment of defendant's counsel violated the principle of 
that case. Consequently, this case should be remanded to permit 
defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and for appointment of 
conflict-free counsel. 
2. In view of the State's concession of reversible 
error under Brown, this Court need not reach the issue of inef-
fectiveness of counsel. 
3. This Court should not award attorney's fees to 
defendant's present appellate counsel. First, this claim is 
raised for the first time on appeal. Second, present defense 
counsel never sought nor received an appointment, but appeared at 
defendant's request in a private capacity. He has at no time 
complied with the statutory procedure for appointment and compen-
sation of indigent's counsel. Moreover, it would be inequitable 
to charge the public with funding an appeal for the purpose of 
achieving relief to which the State stipulated in the trial 
court. Finally, defendant's request for attorney's fees for 
amicus is unsupported by any authority and so must fail. 
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4. Defendant asks this Court to promulgate a general 
order governing appointed defense counsel s conflicts of inter-
est. This Court lacks the authority to enter such an order. 
Furthermore, defendant has not complied with the procedure 
established by the Utah Supreme Court for adopting general 
ethical rules. 
5. Defendant seeks dismissal of all charges against 
her with prejudice. This claim was not preserved below and is 
unsupported by any authority. It must accordingly be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPOINTED COUNSEL'S ASSOCIATION WITH A FIRM 
WHOSE MEMBERS PROSECUTED AND SUPERVISED 
PROSECUTORS AND POLICE CREATED A CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST UNDER STATE V. BROWN AND REQUIRES 
VACATION OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
In the trial court, the State offered to stipulate that 
defendant could withdraw her guilty plea and go to trial. Before 
the conclusion of the evidence, the prosecutor stated: 
MR. LUDLOW: I've got a proposal to Miss 
Swanson, Your Honor. If the defendant agrees 
to withdraw her appeal, the State will stipu-
late that she can withdraw her guilty plea, 
and the Court could reset the case for a jury 
trial and let justice prevail. If the defen-
dant fees like she's [been] cheated out of a 
jury trial, or if she feels like some injus-
tice was committed. Although the State be-
lieves she was treated fairly and provided 
with very competent and effective counsel. 
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(R. 293) .3 Neither defendant nor the court even responded to 
this offer (see R. 293-94). The State now concedes that the 
public defender's conflict of interest requires vacation of 
defendant's guilty plea, the same remedy it offered to stipulate 
to below. This point will set forth the State's rationale for 
this conclusion. 
A. The District Court Erred In Finding that the Rela-
tionship Between Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox and 
Defense Counsel Was One of Landlord/Tenant. 
The trial court found that the relationship between the 
law firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox and the public defender J. 
MacArthur Wright is one of landlord/tenant (R. 93, addendum E). 
Defendant and amicus curiae contest this finding (Brief of 
Appellant [hereinafter Br. App.] 33; Brief of Amicus Curiae 
[hereinafter Br. Am. 9 n.l). 
Two possible standards of review apply. This issue 
might be seen as entailing review of an "historical" fact under 
the clearly erroneous standard. [cite]. Or it might be seen as 
entailing review of a "determination of whether a given set of 
facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law," reviewable 
under the sliding scale of State v. Pena, No. 930101, slip op. at 
5, 10, 11 n.6 (Utah Feb. 15, 1994). This Court need not resolve 
which standard applies, as the State concedes that the finding is 
clearly erroneous, thereby satisfying both standards. 
3
 The prosecution stipulated in the alternative to issuance 
of the certificate of probable cause (R. 293). 
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Findings are clearly erroneous only if they "are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). 
Here, all the evidence presented in the trial court 
tended to show that Mr. Wright's practice was intertwined with 
that of the Gallian firm and that he was on "of counsel" status 
with the firm. There was no testimony that anyone viewed his 
relationship with the firm as merely one of landlord/tenant. 
The Utah Bar counsel gave his uncontradicted expert 
opinion that although of counsel is an amorphous term, it indi-
cates an association closer to a partnership than to an office-
sharing arrangement. A formal ABA ethics opinion defines the 
"core characteristic" properly denoted by the term of counsel as 
a "close, regular, personal relationship"; 
but a relationship which is neither that of a 
partner (or its equivalent, a principal of a 
professional corporation), with the shared 
liability and/or managerial responsibility 
implied by that term; nor, on the other hand, 
the status ordinarily conveyed by the term 
"associate," which is to say a junior non-
partner lawyer, regularly employed by the 
firm. 
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 90-357 (1990). 
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B. On the Facts of This Case, Gallian's Conflict of 
Interest Must Be Imputed to Wright. 
In State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court announced a per se rule of reversal whenever a city 
attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities is appointed to 
represent an indigent defendant. Id. at 857, 859. While citing 
the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, the 
court stated that it was acting pursuant to its "inherent super-
visory power over the courts" as well as its "express power to 
govern the practice of law." Id. at 857. 
This rule would clearly prohibit attorney Gallian from 
serving as a public defender. However, attorney Wright performs 
no prosecutorial functions. Nevertheless, the State believes 
that on the facts of this particular case, the conflict of 
interest must be imputed to Mr. Wright. 
Rule 1.10(a), Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
states: "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them 
shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practic-
ing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 
1.9 or 2.2." There seems no good reason not to extend the reach 
of this rule to attorneys who are of counsel to a firm. The 
American Bar Association has opined, "There can be no doubt that 
an of counsel lawyer (or firm) is 'associated in' and has an 
'association with' the firm (or firms) to which the lawyer is of 
counsel, for purposes of . . . the general imputation of disqual-
ification pursuant to Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules . . . " ABA 
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Comm. on Professional Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 90-357 (1990). 
Moreover, the Ethics Advisory Committee of the Utah 
State Bar has recently published its Opinion No. 126. It reads 
in part: "A city attorney with prosecutorial functions may not 
represent a criminal defense client in any jurisdiction. . . . An 
attorney who is a partner or associate of a city attorney may not 
represent a criminal defense client in any situation where the 
city attorney is so prohibited." Utah State Bar Commission 
Approves Ethics Opinions & 60-Day Comment Period, Utah Bar 
Journal, March 1994, at 23. This opinion forbids an attorney 
associated with a city attorney who performs prosecutorial func-
tions to represent a criminal defense client in any jurisdiction. 
Bar opinions do not bind courts or even practitioners, but they 
do bind bar disciplinary counsel and are entitled to some measure 
of consideration by this Court. 
On the facts of this case, where the firm and the 
involved communities are small, the public defender is closely 
identified with the firm in public advertisements, and the 
strands of potential conflict are many, the State concedes that 
Mr. Wright's representation of defendant as appointed counsel ran 
afoul of Brown. Accordingly, even without a "concrete showing of 
prejudice,fl the appropriate remedy is reversal of the conviction 
and remand for a new trial, or in this instance, a new plea. 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 859, 861. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S SIXTH 
AMENDMENT INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL 
CHALLENGE 
Defendant also claims that she was deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth 
amendment (Br. App. 35) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1983)). In view of the State's confession of revers-
ible error on the issue of dual representation, this Court need 
not reach the question of ineffective assistance. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT AWARD DEFENDANT 
ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-
2 FOR PRIVATE, NON-APPOINTED COUNSEL 
In the trial court, defendant moved for an award of 
attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992) on the 
ground that the State had acted in bad faith. Although defendant 
informs the Court that she sought fees under this statute below, 
she has apparently abandoned this argument on appeal (Br. 38). 
The State will therefore not address it.4 
4
 Section 78-27-56 is mentioned once in the brief, although 
it is misidentified. This is the reference: 
Present counsel requested attorneys fees already 
from the District Court, and same was denied. See 
Addendum, App. 3, "Order Denying Attorneys Fees". 
U.C.A. § 77-27-56 [sic] authorizes attorneys fees 
in civil cases, and UrCivP [sic] 81(e) authorizes 
application of the Rules of Civil Procedure to 
criminal cases. 
So far as section 78-27-56 is concerned, the brief contains no further 
analysis or argument, nor does it include citations to any authorities 
17 
Defendant argues that this Court should appoint 
defendant's appellate counsel under Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 and 
should, pursuant to that statute, award attorney's fees for 
"challenging an unjust conviction,"5 obtaining a certificate of 
probable cause, and bringing the appeal (Br. App. 38). 
Defendant asserts this claim for the first time on 
appeal. In the probable cause hearing, the court asked present 
defense counsel, "With respect to the motion for attorney's fees, 
what is your legal basis for that, Mr. Huntsman?" Counsel 
responded that he relied upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and that 
he reserved any common law theories such as quantum meruit. He 
did not mention section 77-32-2 (see R. 288). 
"As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many 
times, [they] generally will not consider an issue, even a 
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the 
first time." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah App. 1990). 
Similarly, where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground 
for relief in the trial court, an appellate court will not 
consider that ground on appeal. Id. (citing State v. Carter, 707 
or parts of the record relied on as required by rule 24 (a) (9) , Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The State therefore concludes that 
this section has been abandoned as a ground for defendant's claim 
on appeal for attorney's fees. 
5
 It is unclear what this phrase refers to if not the certificate 
of probable cause and the appeal. Defendant did not move to withdraw 
her guilty plea in the trial court. 
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P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985)). Accordingly, this Court should not 
consider defendant's attorney's fee claim on appeal. 
Insofar as defendant's claim may be read as a motion 
for attorney's fees on appeal directed to this Court in the first 
instance (see Br. App. at 38-39), it is misdirected. 
Section 77-32-2(2) (c) sets out a procedure to be 
followed in appointing a non-contracting attorney in a county, 
like Washington County, which has contracted for indigent legal 
services. Where the county has contracted with conflicts 
counsel, they are to be appointed. § 77-32-2(2) (b). Washington 
County has contracted with Douglas Terry to handle cases in which 
MacArthur Wright has a conflict (R. 224-25). Defendant has never 
intimated that Mr. Terry was prevented from representing her by a 
conflict of interest. 
In the event that no contracting attorney is able to 
represent an indigent defendant, the statute provides for 
appointing a non-contracting attorney. It requires (a) a 
hearing; (b) notice to the county attorney; and (c) "findings 
that there is a compelling reasons to appoint a noncontracting 
attorney." Id. In this case, defendant and her present counsel 
made no effort to comply with these requirements. 
Present defense counsel never sought appointment and 
was never appointed by the district court to represent defendant. 
On the contrary, he appeared as private counsel and at 
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defendant's request (R. 33). After the court granted defendant's 
motion for paid transcripts, it queried Mr. Huntsman as follows: 
THE COURT: Mr. Huntsman, let's [sic] me 
ask you just as an officer of the court, are 
you appearing in this matter as retained 
counsel or as pro bono counsel? 
MR. HUNTSMAN: Neither one, Your Honor. 
I've been paid nothing, I have accepted 
nothing, I've been offered nothing. But I 
don't want to waive any right to recover 
anything under the appropriate circumstances. 
THE COURT: All right. And I appreciate 
that record. I think that makes your 
circumstance clear. 
(R. 288-89) . What was clear was that Mr. Huntsman made no claim 
to having been appointed. Amicus aptly observes that Mr. 
Huntsman merely "assumed Swanson's defense" (Br. Am. at 16). 
Furthermore, an assigned counsel is entitled to 
compensation only "upon the approval of the district court where 
the original trial was held." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-3(3) 
(1990). Mr. Huntsman never sought or received this approval. 
Neither defendant nor amicus cites any authority, and 
the State is aware of none, that would permit an unappointed 
"white knight" to ignore the statutory scheme, assume the defense 
of an indigent despite the availability of contract conflicts 
counsel, do nothing to dispel the court's impression that he was 
privately arranged, and then petition the appellate court for 
fees incurred at both trial and appellate levels. 
This would be a different case had the trial court 
improperly refused to appoint conflicts counsel in the face of 
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defendant's colorable claim of conflict of interest. In that 
case, defendant might be entitled to the fees wrongly denied in 
the trial court and those generated in correcting the trial 
court's error. But here the trial court was not presented with 
and therefore did not deny any request for fees under section 77-
32-2.6 
Moreover, the State assails the basic fairness in 
granting this defendant's attorney's fees on this appeal. The 
only claim raised by defendant that is "warranted by existing 
law" or "based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law," Utah R. App. P. 33(b), is her Brown claim. 
The remedy for a Brown violation is reversal of the conviction 
and remand for a new trial, or in this instance, a new plea. 
Brown, 853 P.2d at 859, 861. But the State stipulated to 
withdrawal of the guilty plea in the trial court (see R. 293). 
It seems inequitable to charge the county with funding an appeal 
for the purpose of achieving relief to which the prosecution 
stipulated in the trial court. 
Finally, neither defendant nor amicus cites any author-
ity, and the State is aware of none, supporting an award of 
attorney's fees for amicus (see Br. App. at 45). Accordingly, 
this Court "must disregard this issue." State v. Wareham. 772 
6
 In view of the trial court's issuance of a certificate of 
probable cause, it seems likely that it would have granted a defense 
motion for appointment of appellate conflicts counsel to litigate 
the conflict-of-interest issue. 
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P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); Utah 
R. App. P. 24(d) (9) . 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE A 
GENERAL ORDER GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST, NOR IS ONE NECESSARY 
Defendant asks this Court to promulgate a "bright line" 
rule forbidding government attorneys and their associates to 
represent criminal defendants, whether retained or appointed (Br. 
App. 41-42). 
As defendant herself apparently recognizes, the juris-
diction to promulgate such a general order is vested exclusively 
in the Supreme Court.7 Article VIII section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court by rule shall govern 
the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." The 
court of appeals accordingly lacks jurisdiction to enter the 
general order that defendant seeks. 
Moreover, there is a procedure by which general rules 
of professional conduct are adopted and promulgated by the 
Supreme Court. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 11-101 ("Supreme 
Court rule on rulemaking process"). The procedure is not for the 
7
 His brief requests that the scope of Brown be expanded "by 
Supreme Court Order" (Br. App. 41). 
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court of appeals to announce such rules in judicial opinions 
resolving particular disputes. 
Finally, defendant should take some solace in Opinion 
No. 126 of the Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee of the Utah 
State Bar (addendum F). This opinion, published after the filing 
of defendant's brief, brands as unethical much of the conduct 
defendant seeks to prohibit. While a Bar opinion is not binding 
upon practitioners and the courts, it serves notice that the 
Office of Attorney Discipline will investigate practitioners 
engaging in forbidden conduct. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT THIS COURT DISMISS 
THE CHARGES AGAINST HER WITH PREJUDICE WAS 
NOT PRESERVED BELOW AND IS LEGALLY 
INSUPPORTABLE 
Defendant asserts that she "has already suffered 
enough"; that she was "railroaded through a system unwilling to 
provide her with even the most rudimentary due process, and 
harassed by a hostile district court judge"; that the "voyeuris-
tic arresting officers . . . did wilfully and contemptuously rape 
due process and rendered cruel and unusual punishment to one 
assumed to be innocent" (Br. App. 43). She further asserts that, 
as a victim of "Dixie justice," her "only meaningful remedy . . . 
is dismissal here and now of all her charges, with prejudice and 
on the merits" (Br, App. 43). 
However, defendant filed no motion to dismiss below, on 
these or any other grounds. "A matter is sufficiently raised 
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only if it has been submitted to the trial court and the trial 
court has had an opportunity to rule on the question." State v. 
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003 n.5 (Utah App. 1993). Where, 
as here, "the trial court never had an opportunity to rule on the 
question presented on appeal," this Court "will not address the 
question for the first time on appeal." Id. 
Moreover, defendant cites no authority, and the State 
is aware of none, indicating that dismissal of charges with 
prejudice is an appropriate remedy for any of defendant's alleged 
wrongs or where Brown has been violated or defense counsel found 
ineffective. For this reason alone this Court "must disregard 
this issue." Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966; Amicone, 689 P.2d at 
1344; Reiner, 803 P.2d at 1301 n.2; Webb, 790 P.2d at 71 n.2; 
Utah R. App. P. 24(d)(9). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record on appeal and the applicable law, 
the State respectfully requests that this Court vacate defen-
dant's guilty plea and remand this case for appointment of 
conflict-free counsel and re-prosecution. 
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ADDENDUM E 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
SONJA LE SWANSON, 
Defendant. ] 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW REGARDING THE HEARING 
> OF THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
> CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
i Case No. 931500042 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for a 
Certificate of Probable Cause. A hearing was held on March 5, 1993, and continued on 
for further proceedings on March 8, 1993, and March 12, 1993. The Defendant was 
represented by Mr. R. Clayton Huntsman and was present at all the hearings. The State 
of Utah was represented by Mr. Wade Faraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney on 
March 5,1993, and by Mr. Eric Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, on March 8th and 
12th, 1993. The Court heard the evidence offered by the parties and reviewed the file and 
legal authorities submitted by the parties. The State of Utah took the position that the 
Certificate of Probable Cause should be entered at the conclusion of the hearing. 
However, the Court made certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from the bench 
regarding the relationship between Mr. I. MacArthur Wright, this Defendant's former 
counsel, and the law firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox. The Court instructed Mr. 
Huntsman to prepare written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in accord with the 
Court's ruling from the bench. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
rnosi 
submitted by Mr. Huntsman, but they did not conform with the Court's ruling. After 
instructing Mr. Huntsman to obtain a copy of the Court's tape recorded ruling to assist in 
the accurate preparation of the written document, the Court received another proposed 
pleading that was not complete or in accord with the Court's ruling. 
Therefore, the Court obtained the official transcript of the proceedings of March 
12, 1993, and from tint source has prepared the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court specifically finds that on January the 13th, 1993, this defendant, 
Sonja Le Swanson, was arrested in her own home during a circumstance in which officers 
were executing a search warrant for controlled substances, and, in fact, discovered the 
controlled substance methamphetamine within her home. She was arrested and charged 
with the second-degree felony offense which is set forth in the Information in the file, 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. 
2. The Court further finds that on the 14th day of January, 1993, Miss Swanson 
appeared personally before this judge, and at that time, I placed her under oath and 
questioned her with respect to her financial means to determine whether or not she should 
be appointed counsel. The Court determined at that time Ms. Swanson was indigent. The 
Court then appointed Mr. J. MacArthur Wright to represent the Ms. Swanson. 
3. The Court finds that in the month of January, 1993, Mr. J. MacArthur Wright 
was serving as lead defense counsel for the public defender functions in Washington 
County. Mr. Wright and Mr. Douglas Terry alternate months during the 1993 calendar 
year under their current contract with Washington County, as they had throughout the year 
1992. 
4. The Court specifically finds, from the bind-over order executed by 
Commissioner Lema, that the preliminary hearing was waived by this defendant pursuant 
to a plea agreement, and that the defendant was released from custody. The Court finds 
that the release from custody was foremost in the defendant's mind in reaching the plea 
agreement and entering the plea. 
5. The Court finds that on March the 3rd of 1993, the defendant appeared before 
this court, for sentencing, and the Court executed the judgment, sentence, stay of 
execution of sentence, order of probation and commitment on March the 5th, two days 
later. As a condition of probation, the defendant was ordered to serve 60 days in the 
Washington County Jail, 30 days to be stayed upon the obtaining of substance abuse 
counseling. 
6. With respect to the relationship between this defendant and the law 
firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox and the public defender Mr. J. MacArthur Wright, the 
Court makes the finding that the relationship between Mr. Wright and the firm is one of 
landlord/tenant. The Court does not find that the description "office-sharing" is 
appropriate under these circumstances. 
7. The Court specifically finds that in the relationship of 
landlord/tenant between Mr. Wright and the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox, Mr. 
Wright pays rent of $1,200 a month plus a percentage of the fees generated in civil cases. 
By "civil cases," the Court includes any civil litigation, contracts that might be drafted, 
adoptions, domestic relations, anything that is not related to criminal defense as appointed 
counsel, in the way of the practice of law. The Court likens that relationship to any other 
commercial relationship where a base rent is established, and additional rent, based upon 
revenues of the commercial establishment, is due under the terms of the rental agreement. 
8. In exchange for the rent paid, Mr. Wright receives office and associated space, 
access to the telephone which is the same telephone number as the firm, Gallian, Westfall 
& Wilcox as shown on the letterhead, Exhibit 2. Mr. Wright also receives receptionist 
and secretarial services. 
9. The Court specifically finds that there is no evidence before the Court to 
persuade the Court that any prosecutorial function occurred out of the office of Gallian, 
Westfall & Wilcox during the period of time from January the 14th, 1993, until today's 
date. 
10. The Court further finds that the prosecutorial relationship between the firm of 
Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox with the town of Ivins was terminated on the 11th day of 
March, 1993, at a town council meeting in the town of Ivins. 
11. Prior to that time, the Court finds that the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox 
served as legal counsel to the Town of Ivins for both civil concerns as well as 
prosecutorial functions in cases involving the violation of town ordinances. The Court 
finds that as of the 11th of March, 1993, that no longer is the case, based upon the 
testimony of Mr. Gallian, the town attorney. 
12. The Court further finds that there is no direct evidence of any conflict of 
interest between Mr. Wright in his representation of this defendant and the operation of 
the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox as the town attorney for the Town of Ivins. 
13. The Court finds that there has been, throughout all of this relationship, a clear 
and convincing effort on the part of Mr. J. MacArthur Wright and the firm of Gallian, 
Westfall & Wilcox to maintain the highest ethical standards not only required by the Code, 
but implied through the Code. 
14. The Court specifically finds that the advertisement in Exhibit No. 1 is a 
scrivener's error, having omitted the term " of counsel" for Mr. J. MacArthur Wright and 
his son Jonathan Wright. 
15. The Court finds that the "of counsel" designation has no definition in the 
statutes or the case law of the State of Utah, and the Court places no reliance on the use 
of that term. 
16. The Court further finds that this defendant, Sonja Le Swanson, in a civil 
matter unrelated to this case, had retained as her counsel Mr. John £. Hummel, an 
associate of the firm of Gallian, Westfall & Wilcox, as her own counsel in a domestic 
matter which apparently is concluded. While that attorney /client relationship is not seen 
by this court as any waiver, it is a unique fact circumstance which is found by the Court. 
17. The Court specifically finds that as of January 1st of 1993, Mr. Gallian is now 
serving as a Washington County commissioner. That among Mr. Gallian's executive 
functions as a Washington County commissioner is the budgetary supervision of the 
county attorney's office. 
18. The Court specifically finds that Mr. Gallian's supervision is only budgetary, 
and that his elective position in no way impacts the prosecutorial decisions of the 
Washington County Attorney's office. 
19. With respect to Ms. Swanson's representation by Mr. J. MacArthur Wright, 
the Court has already found that Ms. Swanson knowingly and voluntarily entered her plea. 
The Court finds that she was represented by capable, competent counsel with many years' 
experience before the criminal bar. After review of the facts of this case as stated by Mr. 
Wright, after the waiver of client confidences, the Court finds that this Defendant was ably 
represented in the negotiation of this plea agreement. 
20. The Court finds that this defendant knowingly and intentionally and voluntarily 
entered her plea of guilty on the 20th day of January, 1993. The Court conducted a 
careful Rule 11 colloquy with this defendant to make sure that she understood the rights 
that she would be giving up, the opportunities that she would have at trial, and the Court 
found then and finds now that Ms. Swanson appears to be operating under no duress, no 
threat or coercion, and frankly does not appear to this Court to be so naive as her 
Affidavit might set her out to be. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The clear mandate set forth in the recent Utah. Supreme Court case of State v. 
Brown. 201 Utah Adv. Rep 4, handed down on November 30, 1992, is quoted for 
reference: 
Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to appoint a 
city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we 
conclude that vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when a city 
prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an accused. Consequently, we hold 
that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over 
the courts, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to 
defend indigent persons; therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction and order a new 
trial. 
2. The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys states, in pertinent 
part: 
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by 
Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly 
represent a person in the same or a substantially factually related matter in which that 
lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer has associated, had previously represented a 
client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer 
had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the 
matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not 
prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to 
those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless: 
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly 
associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client 
under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
3. The current version of Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
states: 
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if the court hearing the 
application determines that there are meritorious issues that should be decided by 
the appellate court. 
4. In balancing the mandate in State v. Brown, supra., with the facts as found 
in this case, the Court determines that there is a meritorious issue to be decided by the 
Utah Court of Appeals. Therefore, a Certificate of Probable Cause will issue. 
5. Counsel for the Defendant should prepare the Certificate of Probable Cause 
and submit it to the Court for signature and entry. 
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DATED this 30th day of March, 1993 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following counsel this [&+. day of 
(jL^tv'.y 1993, by first class mail, postage pre-paid: 
Mr. R. Clayton Huntsman 
2 West St. George Boulevard, No. 31 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Mr. Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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ADDENDUM F 
Utah State Bar 
Commission 
Approves Ethics 
Opinions & 60-Day 
Comment Period 
The Board of Bar Commissioners has 
adopted a policy whereby ethics opinions 
will be approved, pursuant to the recom-
mendations of the Ethics Advisory 
Opinion Committee, pending a 60-day 
comment period following publication in 
the Bar Journal. 
Opinion No. 126 
Approved January 27,1994 
Issue: Under what circumstances may a 
city attorney represent criminal defendants? 
Opinion: A city attorney with prosecuto-
rial functions may not represent a criminal 
defense client in any jurisdiction. A city 
attorney with no prosecutorial functions, 
who has been appointed as city attorney 
pursuant to statute, may not represent a 
criminal defense client in that city, but 
may represent a criminal defense client in 
other jurisdictions, provided that Rule 
1.7(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct is satisfied. An attorney with no 
prosecutorial functions, who is retained by 
a city on a contract or retainer basis, may 
represent a criminal defense client in any 
jurisdiction, provided that Rule 1.7(a) is 
satisfied. An attorney who is a partner or 
associate of a city attorney may not represent 
a criminal defense client in any situation 
where the city attorney is so prohibited. 
Opinion No. 138 
Approved January 27,1994 
Issue: May a currently practicing sole 
practitioner who formerly had associates 
or junior partners continue to use the firm 
name that includes the sole practitioner's 
name followed by "& Associates'*? 
Opinion: A lawyer may not use **& Asso-
ciates'9 as part of a firm name where no 
attorney associates are currently employed 
by that firm. 
Opinion No. 139 
Approved January 27,1994 
Issue: May a law firm's nonlawyer office 
administrator be compensated solely on 
ANNOUNCEMENT: 
Recruiting Ethics Advisory Committee Members 
The Utah State Bar is now accepting 
applications for membership on the Ethics 
Advisory Opinion Committee for terms 
beginning July 1,1994. 
In response to the increasing importance 
and frequency of occurrence of ethical 
issues that affect Utah lawyers, the Board of 
Bar Commissioners has modified the proce-
dure for constituting the Ethics Advisory 
Opinion Committee. Beginning July 1, 
1994, the Committee will comprise the 
Chair and 12 members, who will be 
appointed upon application to the Bar. Reg-
ular appointments will be for three years, 
although some appointments will be ini-
tially for one and two years to provide for 
staggered terms. 
The Committee is charged with prepar-
ing written opinions concerning the ethical 
propriety of anticipated professional or per-
sonal conduct, when requested to do so by 
the Utah State Bar, and forwarding these 
opinions to the Board of Bar Commission-
ers for their consideration. 
Because the written opinions of the 
Committee have major and enduring signif-
icance to the Bar and the general public, the 
Board wishes to solicit the participation of 
lawyers (including the judiciary) who can 
make a significant commitment to the goals 
of the Committee and the Bar. 
If you are interested in serving on the Ethics 
Advisory Opinion Committee, please submit 
an application with the following informa-
tion, either in resume or narrative form: 
• Basic information, such as years and 
location of practice, type of practice (large 
the basis of a percentage of the gross 
income of the firm? 
Opinion: Under Rule of Professional Con-
duct 5.4(a)(3), a lawyer or law firm may 
include nonlawyer employees in a compen-
sation or retirement plan, which may be 
based upon a percentage of die net or gross 
income of the firm, so long as compensation 
is not tied to receipt of particular fees. The 
nonlawyer*s employment, however, must 
still comport with Rule 5.4(d), which pre-
vents the nonlawyer from owning an 
interest in or controlling the activities of a 
law practice. 
firm, solo, corporate, government, etc.), 
and substantive areas of practice. 
• A brief description of your interest in 
the Committee, including relevant experi-
ence, interest in or ability to contribute to 
well-written, well-researched opinions. 
This should be a statement in the nature of 
what you can contribute to the Committee. 
Appointments will be made by a panel 
comprising the Bar President, the Liaison 
Commissioner for the Ethics Advisory 
Opinion Committee and the Chairman of 
the Committee for the ensuing year. The 
panel's selections are intended to accom-
plish two general goals: 
• Appointment of members who are will-
ing to dedicate the effort necessary to 
cany out the responsibilities of the Com-
mittee and who are committed to the 
issuance of timely, well-reasoned, articu-
late opinions. 
• Creation of a balanced Committee that 
incorporates as many diverse views and 
backgrounds as possible. The selection 
panel will attempt to create a Committee 
with balance in: substantive practice areas, 
type of practice (small firm, government, 
etc.), geographical location, and experience. 
If you would like to contribute to this 
important function of the Bar, please sub-
mit a letter indicating your interest to: 
Ethics Advisory Opinion 
Committee Selection Panel 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
NOTICE 
The 12th Annual State and 
Local Government Conference, 
sponsored by the Government 
and Politics Legal Society of the 
J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
will be held at the Provo Park 
Hotel on Friday, March 18,1994. 
Any questions should be 
directed to Alex Maynex at 
378-3593. 
Mmkim 23 
